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Morton: Confessions

CONFESSIONS
State v. Sprouse, 297 S.E.2d 833 (W. Va. 1982).
State v. Williams, 301 S.E.2d 187 (W. Va. 1983).
State v. Jackson, 298 S.E.2d 866 (W. Va. 1982).
The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals decided several cases this
year concerning the admissibility of confessions and other incriminating
statements made by suspects before trial. The court held that once a suspect
is released by a municipal judge after pleading guilty to a charge of public intoxication, his subsequent detention by the police is an "arrest" requiring
probable cause before a confession obtained during that detention will be admissible.1 The court also ruled on circumstances which may separate later
confessions from an earlier inadmissible confession, dissipating the taint of
the earlier confession and allowing the later ones to be admissible.' Finally,
the court mandated that pre-trial psychiatric hearings be tape-recorded, that
copies of the tape be given to counsel for the defense, to counsel for the state,
and to the judge, and that an in camera hearing must be held to assure that
no self-incriminating statements of the defendant are included in the
psychiatrist's testimony.'
Confessions which are the product of illegal police activities have long
been inadmissible in court.' The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals applied this rule during the survey period and held that the detention of a
suspect following his release from jail on a separate charge is an arrest requiring probable cause; without it, confessions acquired during the later
interrogation are inadmissible.5 Further, the court held that where a confession is found to be inadmissible because of an illegal custodial search, subsequent confessions will also be held to be inadmissible where no evidence is
presented to show that they are unconnected."
In the first case,7 the defendant Sprouse was arrested for public intoxication. He spent the night in a room in the local municipal building before appearing before a municipal judge the following morning.' Sprouse pleaded
guilty to the charge of public intoxication and was released from custody.' He
was not, however, permitted to leave the building, but instead was detained
by detectives from the city police department." He was given the required

2

State v. Sprouse, 297 S.E.2d 833 (W. Va. 1982).
State v. Williams, 301 S.E.2d 187 (W. Va. 1983).
State v. Jackson, 298 S.E.2d 866 (W. Va. 1982).
See Halvonik, Exclusionary Rules: An Introduction,33 HASTINGS L.J. 1057 (1982).
State v. Sprouse, 297 S.E.2d 833 (W. Va. 1982).

6

301 S.E.2d 187.

2

297 S.E.2d 833.
297 S.E.2d at 834.
Id. at 835.

10 Id.
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Miranda warnings, and, about two hours later, confessed to a theft.11
Sprouse was subsequently charged with theft in a multi-count indictment. He filed a pre-trial motion to have the confession suppressed as the
product of a warrantless, unconstitutional arrest.12 The circuit court denied
the motion, noting that the defendant
had made the confession after he was
13
given his Miranda warnings.

On appeal, the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals gave no weight
to the State's contention that Sprouse's questioning was the result of his
legal arrest for public intoxication. 4 Instead, the court concluded that
Sprouse had been arrested for investigatory purposes. 5 The court looked to
the reasons for the defendant's detention to determine whether the police
had probable cause for the detention. Because the only testimony on record
was an officer's statement that he had a "personal opinion" that the police
"needed to talk" to Sprouse, the court concluded probable cause had not been
established. 8
Next, the court looked to see if the "causal connection" between the illegal arrest and the confession had been broken, which would still have permitted the introduction of the confession. The giving of Miranda warnings
was not sufficient to break the causal connection between Sprouse's detention and subsequent confession. 8
In determing the admissibility of the confession, the court relied upon its
holding in State v. Stanley.19 Stanley lists three factors to be considered by a

Id.
12

Id. at 834.

IS

Id. at 835.

, The State attempted to distinguish Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200 (1979), by saying
that the defendant in Dunaway had been seized without probable cause, but that Sprouse had
been arrested legally for public intoxication. The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals found
no distinction and applied the Dunaway analysis.
In Dunaway, a defendant was taken into custody for interrogation without probable cause,
read the Miranda warnings, and induced to give a confession. The United States Supreme Court
held that the confession was an exploitation of the illegal arrest, and therefore inadmissible.
1" 297 S.E.2d at 835. The court does not indicate upon what facts this conclusion is based.
I !d.
17 This

concept has its origins in constitutional analysis and is stated in Dunaway as follows:
"[A]lthough a confession after proper Miranda warnings may be found 'voluntary' for purposes of
the Fifth Amendment, this type of 'voluntariness' is merely a threshold requirement for Fourth
Amendment analysis." 442 U.S. at 217, (quoting Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590 (1975)).
West Virginia has explicitly followed the federal rule: "[W]e . . . follow the wisdom of our
federal brethren that exclusion of the confession is mandated only if it is a result of the illegal arrest and the causal connection between the illegal arrest and the confession has not been broken."
State v. Canby, 252 S.E.2d 164, 167 (W. Va. 1979).
's 297 S.E.2d at 835.
19284 S.E.2d 367 (W. Va. 1981).
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court in determining whether a confession is the result of the exploitation of
an illegal arrest: (1) The temporal proximity between the arrest and the confession; (2) the presence or absence of intervening circumstances in addition
to the Miranda warnings; and (3) the purpose or flagrancy of the officer(s)'
conduct."
The court found two of the three factors present in this case, requiring a
reversal of Sprouse's conviction. First, the court found the temporal proximity between the arrest and conviction to be too close. The confession was
given within ninety minutes of the illegal arrest, which did not allow the
defendant sufficient time to reflect upon the consequences of his act.
Moreover, the defendant had not been allowed to leave the municipal
building where he had been detained." Second, the court found that there
were no intervening circumstances between the arrest and subsequent confession.22 Finally, although the court noted that there was no evidence of purposeful or flagrant misconduct,' the temporal proximity and lack of intervening circumstances warranted a finding that the confession was inadmissible.2
In the case of State v. Williams,' the court looked at a series of confessions whose admissibility was in question due to an illegal custodial search by
police. Williams had been accused in the beating deaths of Dorothy and
Carlton Harris.28 He was convicted of the murder of Dorothy Harris based on
a confession obtained following the finding of incriminating evidence during a
custodial searchY The conviction was later overturned and the confession
held inadmissible.' Williams was then convicted of the murder of Carlton
Harris, based on the introduction of four confessions made subsequent to the
first." Williams appealed, contending that those later confessions were the
product of the same illegal search as the first confession and should also have
been ruled inadmissible."
In reversing and remanding the conviction, the West Virginia Supreme
Court of Appeals stated that the inadmissibility of the first confession gave
rise to a presumption of the invalidity of the confessions which followed it."
Id. at 368.

21 237 S.E.2d at 836.
2Id.
23

Id.

24

Id.
301 S.E.2d 187.

2 Id. at 188.
2Id.

State v. Williams, 249 S.E.2d 758 (W. Va. 1980).
301 S.E.2d at 188.
"Id.
S1 Id. at 189. The admissibility of Williams' confession was the subject of two previous cases.
In State v. Williams, 249 S.E.2d 758, the court found the first of Williams' confessions inadmissable, and stated that its inadmissibility gave rise to the presumption of the inadmissibility of
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In order to use the subsequent confessions, the State must prove that the
connection between the later confessions and the first inadmissible confession had become "so attenuated as to extinguish the taint of the first.""2
In examining the series of events that led to the subsequent confessions,
the court listed a series of factors, each of which contributed to its decision
that the later confessions were connected to the first.3 First, because the
defendant was of limited intelligence," it was questionable whether the
defendant was capable of the "mental regrouping" required to make the later
confessions separate from the first.' Second, the detention of the defendant
was uninterrupted." Third, there was no lawyer present during the repeated
interrogation, 7 while the same police officers were present throughout.'
Fourth and most important, the officers' own testimony indicated that the
confessions seemed to be cumulative, not individual. 9
While the holdings of Sprouse and Williams extend no new constitutional
guarantees, they do clarify the application of basic principles in specific situations. In Sprouse, the court makes it quite clear that the legal arrest of a
defendant cannot be used to support his continued detention and interrogation following his release by the court on those charges. Williams provides insight into the weight which will be allotted to the various factors in determining the extent to which subsequent confessions are connected to earlier
statements. Analysis of the cases provides excellent examples of the reasoned application by the court of basic principles concerning the admissibility of
confessions and the court's continued requirement of firm adherence to these
principles.
Confessions and other incriminating statements made by a suspect of

the subsequent confessions. Id. at 764. In State ex re. Williams v. Narick, 264 S.E.2d 851 (M. Va.
1980), the court refused on procedural grounds to issue a writ prohibiting the use of the four later
confessions at the trial court level.
301 S.E.2d at 189 (quoting State ex rel. Williams v. Narick, 264 S.E.2d 851, 855 (W. Va.
1980)).
301 S.E.2d at 859.
Id. The court discussed psychiatric opinion which found the defendant to be highly
amenable to suggestion: "The defense's psychiatric expert testified at length to the appellant's
susceptibility to suggestion. Although the State's expert disagreed with the defense expert's conclusions on nearly every matter, he did admit of the appellant that 'you can put anything in his
mouth:" Id. at 859 n.1. In addition, the appellant had an I.Q. measured at 59, putting him in the
category of extremely low intelligence. Id. at 859.
3 Id.
36 Id.

I Id. The court added that the appellant's confession did not fail on the basis of access to a
lawyer, as he did not request counsel. However, it continued to say that advice of counsel could be
found sufficient to break the causal connection in similar circumstances. Id. at 190 n.2.
3 Id.
I Id. at 190-91.
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questionable sanity were discussed by the supreme court in State v.
0
The court strongly suggested that before admitting into evidence
Jackson."
any confession made by a suspect claiming insanity, the trial court should
carefully study the competency of the suspect to waive his right to counsel
and his capacity to make a statement.4 1 The court also held that incriminating
statements made to a psychiatrist during a court-ordered psychiatric examination were inadmissible at trial.42 Further, from the date of this decision,
all such examinations must be tape-recorded and copies of the tape must be
furnished to both counsel and the judge for a determination of which
statements made during the examination are inadmissible.43
Benjamin Franklin Jackson had been a friend of Stephen Weems for
several years.4 One morning, Jackson bought a handgun, went to Weems'
home, smoked marijuana with Weems, then shot and killed him. 4 Jackson hid
on the hillside for several hours before surrendering to police and making a
tape-recorded confession. 6 He was put into jail, at which time his lawyer immediately moved that Jackson be examined for mental illness.' Within the
next few days, Jackson was ordered transferred to Weston State Hospital,
where he was determined to be incompetent to stand trial due to chronic, undifferentiated schizophrenia. Jackson remained incompetent for one and a
half years.49 He was later convicted of the first-degree murder of Weems."0
Jackson appealed, claiming as error the admission into evidence of his
confession made on the same day as the shooting." The three psychiatrists
who examined Jackson at the hospital testified that they believed Jackson
was mentally ill at the time he committed the offense.2
Because the case was reversed on other grounds,' the supreme court did
" 298 S.E.2d 866.
" Id. at 869.
42Id. at 872. Jackson's trial predated the effective date of the West Virginia Rules of
Criminal Procedure, although the rules are in accord with this decision. See W. VA. R. Civ. P.
12.2(c) (1982), which states in part: "No statement made by the accused in the course of any examination provided for by this rule.., shall be admitted in evidence against the accused on the
issue of guilt in any criminal proceeding."
's 298 S.E.2d at 873.
Id. at 868.
I5
Id.

"Id.
47Id.
48 Id.
49Id.
sOId.
5Id.
Id. One psychiatrist believed that Jackson was responsible for his conduct. Dr. Knapp had
been appointed by the court, and was used by the State for rebuttal at the trial. He did not,
however, testify at the suppression hearing. Id.
" The supreme court reversed because the trial court failed to instruct the jury about the
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not rule on the admissibility of the confession. However, the court took great
care to point out that the law in West Virginia is that "[c]onfessions elicited
by law enforcement authorities from persons suspected of crimes who
because of mental condition cannot knowledgeably and intelligently waive
their right to counsel are inadmissible."" Noting that the confession was
made the day of the shooting, the court reasoned that if Jackson was mentally ill the day he committed the crime he was also mentally incompetent, so
that he could not waive his right to counsel or make a valid statement.5
Noting that the state had the burden'of proving the admissibility of the confession by a preponderance of the evidence," the supreme court suggested
that further evidence be elicited as to the defendant's condition at the time
the confession was made.' The trial court should carefully study the defendant's competency to waive his right to counsel and his capacity to make a
statement.'
Jackson also argued that statements he made to the court-appointed
psychiatrist should have been held inadmissible because they were made during a custodial interrogation without being prefaced by Miranda warnings
and with no lawyer present.-9
While the admissibility of statements made to a psychiatrist has been
considered by other courts,"0 this was the first time this issue had been considered by the West Virginia court. The court began its analysis by stating
that, if the defendant presents or intends to present an insanity defense, relying on expert psychiatric or psychological evidence, he may be compelled to
participate in a psychiatric examination for competence to stand trial and for
criminal responsibility."' For purposes of self-incrimination analysis, a courtordered psychiatrist is a state agent who questions a defendant while he is in
custody." The defendant's self-incrimination privileges under the fifth
consequences to a defendant of being adjudged criminally insane. "In any case where the defendant relies upon the defense of insanity, the defendant is entitled to any instruction which advises
the jury about the further disposition of the defendant in the event of a finding of not guilty by
reason of insanity which correctly states the law ....
State v. Nuckolls, 273 S.E.2d 87 (W. Va.
1980).
Id. (quoting State v. Hamrick, 236 S.E.2d 247 (W. Va. 1977)).
298 S.E.2d at 868.
State v. Woods, 289 S.E.2d 500 (W. Va. 1982). See State v. Wilcox, 286 S.E.2d 257 (W. Va.
1982).
298 S.E.2d at 868.

Id. at 869.
59Id.
I Houston v. State, 602 P.2d 784 (Alaska 1979); State v. Corbin, 15 Or. App. 536, 516 P.2d
1314 (1973); Lee v. County Court of Erie County, 27 N.Y.2d 432, 318 N.Y.S.2d 705, 267 N.E.2d 452
(1971).
61 298 S.E.2d at 870.

11The Oregon court noted: "[Tihe psychiatrist examining the defendent for the state is for
all purposes an officer of the state and no different than any police officer when questioning a
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amendment and West Virginia Constitution article III, section 5 are therefore implicated."
The court noted that Miranda warnings are but one way of protecting a
defendant's rights," and, in this instance, possibly not the best way: "A
defendant who pleads insanity does not have the privilege to 'remain silent'
as Miranda warnings advise. His refusal to be examined-an event that
necessarily involves talk-may result in sanctions such as preventing him
from submitting his own medical evidence of insanity."6 To better protect
the rights of mentally ill defendants, the court mandated that an in camera
hearing be held to excise any portions of the psychiatrist's testimony that include incriminating statements made to the psychiatrist by the defendant.6
These procedures cannot be waived except upon the advice of counsel:
When a court ... orders a pre-trial psychiatric examination of a defendant, we can presume there is a question about defendant's competency or
mental condition. To guarantee that state and federal constitutional rights are
scrupulously honored in these circumstances, we find
that no waiver of these
7
rights will be effective without notice of counsel.
The court then went on to discuss the defendant's right to counsel. While
noting that several courts have not found a pre-trial psychiatric interview to
be a "critical stage" requiring access to counsel,68 the supreme court noted
that the results of such examination bear greatly on defendant's fair trial
rights and should include the right to assistance of counsel. 9 The court stopped short, however, of requiring counsel's presence at the examination. 6
Fearing that counsel's presence could affect the accuracy and effectiveness of

defendant." State v. Corbin, 15 Or. App. 536, 544; 516 P.2d 1314, 1318 (1973). It was important that
this be made known to the defendant: "The defendant must be aware that the psychiatrist is
employed by his adversary and is not primarily a healer." Id. at 546, 516 P.2d at 1319.
298 S.E.2d at 871.
Id. at 869. The Mirandacourt specifically left the selection of procedures to the states: "We
have already pointed out that the Constitution does not require any specific code of procedures
for protecting the privilege against self-incrimination during custodial interrogation. Congress and
the States are free to develop their own safeguards for the privilege so long as they are fully as
effective as the Miranda warnings ....
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 490 (1966).
" 298 S.E.2d at 872. The court refused to consider the argument that by pleading not guilty
by reason of insanity the defendant had waived his right to remain silent, holding that constitutional rights are not easily waived. Id. at 870. Cf. Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454 (1981).
298 S.E.2d at 872.
6 Id. at 873. This reasoning is the same used by the court in State ex rel. J.M. v. Taylor, 276
S.E.2d 199 (W. Va. 1981), in which it held a juvenile defendant may not waive his rights except on
advice of counsel.
11See, e.g., United States v. Baird, 414 F.2d 700 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied 396 1005 (1969);
U.S. v. Trapnell, 495 F.2d 22 (2d Cir. 1974); United States v. Albright, 388 F.2d 719 (4th Cir. 1968).
298 S.E.2d at 872.
o Id. Some states have permitted counsel to be present. See Howe v. State, 611 P.2d 16
(Alaska 1980); State v. Corbin, 15 Or. App. 505, 539 P.2d 1113 (1973).
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the examination,71 the court instead noted that the mandatory tape-recording
of the examination and the required in camera hearing to suppress incriminating statements would do away with the need for the presence of
counsel at the examination.72
The court mandated tape-recording does not interfere with any doctorpatient privilege. Unlike several other states," West Virginia does not
statutorily recognize a psychiatrist-patient relationship as "privileged." Instead, the communication between the patient and psychiatrist is considered
"confidential information," and may be disclosed under certain, statutorily
specified circumstances." One of these is when a defendant is a party to an involuntary psychiatric examination by order of the court."6 This exception is
not surprising, and is consistent with the law of other states."0
The lack of encroachment on a recognized privilege, however, does not
mean that there are not other questions about the use of tape-recording in
this instance. In requiring the taping of pre-trial psychiatric interviews, the
court did not say to what extent the material from the tapes will be permitted to be used in court, or for what reasons the recorded material may be used. The Alaska case cited by the court suggested that tape-recording would
aid in accuracy. 77 However, it is difficult to see what purpose tape-recordings

"'

See Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454. The court notes a federal circuit court of appeals find

ing.

. 298 S.E.2d at 873. The court says "[i]f the dangers of not having counsel present are
eliminated by legislation or rule, then no rights are violated." Id. See United States v. Wade, 388
U.S. 218, 239 (1967).
7 All but two states (South Carolina and West Virginia) statutorily recognize some form of
physician-patient, psychiatrist-patient, psychologist-patient, or psychotherapist-patient privilege.
Schuman and Weiner, The Privilege Study: An Empirical Examination of the PsychotherapistPatientPrivilege, 60 N.C.L. REv.912 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Privilege Study].
","(a) Communication and information obtained in the course of treatment or evaluation of
any client or patient shall be deemed to be 'confidential information ....... W. VA. CODE § 27-3-1
(1977).
11W. VA. CODE § 27-3-1 (1977) provides in part that confidential information may be disclosed:
(2) In a proceeding under article six-A [§ 27-6A-1 et seq.] of this chapter to disclose the
results of an involuntary examination made pursuant thereto."
W. VA. CODE § 27-6A-1 (Supp. 1983) provides:
(a) Whenever a court of record ...believes a defendant in a felony case or a defendant
in a misdemeanor case in which an indictment has been returned, or a warrant or summons issued, may be incompetent to stand trial or is not criminally responsible by
reasons of mental illness, mental retardation, or addiction, it may ... order an examination of such defendant to be conducted by one or more psychiatrists ....
7' "Application of the privileges requires that a person consult one whom he reasonably
believes to be a physician or psychotherapist for the purpose of treatment or diagnosis in contemplation of treatment. For example, examinations to prepare for judicial testimony or as a prerequisite for employment are outside the privilege." Schuman and Weiner, Privilege Study, supra
note 73 at 908-12.
298 S.E.2d at 873 (quoting Houston v. State, 602 P.2d 784, 796 (Alaska 1979)).
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would serve that could not be served as adequately by a written transcript,78
or in what way a higher degree of accuracy would be gained by video-taping,
which is preferred by the court." One author feels that an additional reason
for the right to assistance of counsel in this instance, and an additional purpose of the taping, is to provide the defendant with the basis for impeaching
the psychiatrist's testimony:
[To be acceptable the videotaping must record all aspects of the interview and accurately depict such factors as the environment in which the interview is conducted and the verbal and non-verbal communication of both the
defendant and the psychiatrist in order to provide the absent attorney with a
sound basis for preparing for cross-examination of the psychiatrist at trial.n
For this purpose tape-recording is a decidedly inadequate instrument. Even
the preferred videotaping may not provide the attorney with the subtle
nuances involved in the examination. This may be the reason why some
courts which permit taping as a substitute for presence of counsel do so on a
discretionary basis,8 ' rather than apply the taping to all situations as has
been done by the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals.
Susan E. Morton

7,The court may have believed a court reporter would have been intrusive in the examination. However, copies of the transcriptions to the tapes could be made available to counsel and to
the judge for the hearing. If anything, this would seem to be much less wieldy than the tapes.
298 S.E.2d at 873 n.9
'

Note, The Right to CounselDuring Court-OrderedPsychiatricExaminations of Criminal

Defendants, 26 VILL. L. REV. 135, 164-65 (1981).
" The Alaska court stated: "We think that all such future psychiatric interviews should be
tape-recorded in their entirety. This requirement will aid in attaining the goal of accuracy at trial
and, in the discretion of the defendant and his counsel, offers a potentially adequate alternative to
the physical presence of defense counsel during the psychiatric interview." Houston v. State, 602
P.2d at 796.
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